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With a BSE incident in the United States (US) in December of 2003, questions arose 
about the effect of the incident on consumers in the US. The purpose of this paper is 
to determine if traceability systems for beef can help preserve consumer demand 
following the discovery of BSE. Auctions were conducted approximately 3 weeks 
before and after the December 2003 BSE incident in the U.S It was found that 
overall there was no effect on the size of the bribes needed by the BSE incidence. 
However, for some groups there were important changes.  The results indicate that 
information about traceability and country of origin is valuable to consumers. They 
also suggest that greater uncertainty about certifications and assurances for beef 
existed among the participants after December 23rd than before December 23rd.  
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Introduction 
 
The announcement on December 23, 2003 that a dairy cow in the state of 
Washington had been diagnosed with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or 
Mad-Cow Disease) was a watershed event for US livestock markets. Although US 
consumer demand for beef appeared to remain strong in the weeks following the 
event, US beef industry and US government recognized the need to move rapidly 
forward with plans to implement some type of traceability in US livestock systems.  
 
Traceability is a critical element for dealing with BSE.2 Although traceability 
cannot prevent the disease, once BSE is detected traceability is essential for 
tracking the source of the disease. Traditional inspection systems focus on 
eliminating pathogens in the food marketing chain, mostly at the processor and food 
preparation levels of the chain. Because BSE is thought to originate with 
contaminated farm-level inputs (feed), the farms where an infected animal has been 
must be identified together with any partner animals on those farms that may have 
also been infected through the same feed source. Animal identification (ID) is 
essential for tracking these movements. 
 
Support for the US National Animal Identification System (NAIS),3 a plan 
suggested as a blueprint for implementing animal identification (ID) in the US by 
the summer of 2005, began to build following the discovery of BSE in Canada 
(Alberta) in May 2003 and became quite general among US livestock producer 
groups after December 2003 (e.g., Breckendorf (2004); Lyon (2004); Denis (2004); 
Philippi (2004); and Smith (2004)). The apparently high level of support now 
enjoyed by the NAIS belies much of the discussion prior to May 2003 surrounding 
the possible implementation of traceability systems in the US meat system. Prior to 
2003, these discussions centered on market solutions to the traceability issue and 
specifically the ability of firms to recapture costs incurred in implementing the 
systems. Specifically, these discussions centered on 1) if consumers were willingness 
to pay (WTP) for these additional costs through paying premiums for traceable meat 
products, and 2) how benefits and costs of traceability would be shared in the 
marketing chain (e.g., Wiemers (2001); Buhr (2002); Sparks (2002); Dickinson and 
Bailey (2002); Dickinson and Bailey (2003); and Bailey, Jones, and Dickinson 
(2002)).  
 
The purpose of this paper is to determine if traceability systems for beef can help 
preserve consumer demand following the discovery of BSE. We focus specifically on 
the US and examine whether consumer willingness to accept (WTA)4 non-traceable 
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terrorism concerns in the food chain, and narrowing the focus (limiting) of food recalls.  
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beef either imported from Canada or produced domestically changed following the 
US BSE case in December 2003.  
 
Although public discussion in the US since December 2003 has shifted somewhat 
away from proprietary interests such as WTP to now focus on public goods (e.g., 
animal disease control and eradication and bioterrorism), consumer acceptance of 
beef products and certifications made to consumers about beef products in light of 
BSE remain important issues.  
 
US livestock systems have lagged principal competitors and customers in the 
development of livestock traceability systems (Lewis (2001); Liddell and Bailey 
(2001); Bailey and Dickinson (2002)). For example, Canada implemented a 
mandatory cattle identification plan in the summer of 2002 with oversight by the 
Canadian Cattle Identification Agency (CCIA) (see http://www.canadaid.com/). The 
European Union, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Uruguay have either 
implemented animal traceability systems or are actively engaged in doing so 
(Baines and Davies (1998) and (2000); Lewis (2001); Liddell and Bailey (2001)). 
 
Canada is an important case study for the US beef industry in relation to BSE 
because the US and Canadian beef systems are quite similar and because the US 
and Canada have traditionally competed in the same markets. Prior to May 2003, 
Canadian live cattle imports into the US accounted for as much as 8% of total US 
cattle slaughter but this was reduced to zero virtually overnight following the BSE 
case in Alberta. The CCIA’s system provided valuable assistance in tracking the 
infected animal’s movements. Given that a traceability system was in place in 
Canada before the discovery of BSE there, and that Canadian beef can be purchased 
in the US, 5 one could ask if the existence of the CCIA’s traceability system has 
helped to bolster US consumer demand for Canadian beef both before the Canadian 
BSE case and after the US BSE case. The same question could be asked about 
foreign consumer demand for US beef exports following the December 2003 event.  
 
The question is whether or not traceability and country-of-origin information have 
become more valuable to American consumers since December 2003. This is an 
important issue because it has implications not only for beef markets but also for 
public policy. For example, as the US government and US meat industry move 
toward implementing the NAIS, the issue of who should pay for the system has 
become important (Farm Foundation (2004)). This study presents results from two 
sets of auction experiments examining US consumer WTA non-traceable beef from 
the US and Canada both before the US BSE case in December 2003 and after the 
US BSE announcement. The data allow for this comparison because one set of the 
auction experiments was serendipitously completed just prior to the December 2003 
                                                           
5 Boneless Canadian beef from animals less than 30 months of age resumed in September 2003. The US border 
remains closed to live cattle shipments at the time of this writing (Robb (2004)).  R. Ward, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
© 2005 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved.  95





A substantial body of literature has examined how consumers value information 
about food products. The foundation for much of this work was laid by research that 
established the value of labeling products for attributes such as food safety (e.g., 
Caswell (1998); and Caswell and Padberg (1992); Huffman et al. (2003a)). This work 
suggested that consumer choices are influenced by the information provided by food 
labels.  
 
Other research has focused on the value of information on individual characteristics 
that could either be placed on labels or communicated to consumers in other ways.6 
Recently a substantial body of research has focused on consumer acceptance of and 
government policy towards genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) in food products 
(e.g., Rousu et al. (2004); Lusk, Roosen, and Fox (2003); Lusk and Fox (2002); 
Huffman et al. (2003a) and (2003b); and Caswell (2000)). Other studies have 
examined the possibility of adding value to commodity or food products by providing 
consumers information on a myriad of different single or bundled characteristics 
including certifying enhanced food safety, the processes used to produce food, the 
location where food was produced, or the certifying agency (e.g., Loureiro (2003); 
Loureiro and Umberger (2003); Dickinson and Bailey (2003); Dickinson and Bailey 
(2002)).  
 
Traceability is a unique form of information for a food product because it provides 
information as a single characteristic (e.g., provides the potential of legal recourse) 
but also is used as a method to verify other product characteristics (e.g., enhanced 
food safety, humane animal treatment, environmental responsibility, social 
responsibility, etc.). A few studies have addressed the issue of traceability directly 
and have found traceability to be a valuable characteristic in food products (e.g., 
Hobbs (1996a) and (1996b); Dickinson and Bailey (2002) and (2003); and Buhr 
(2002)). 
 
While the studies mentioned above used various methods, they generally support 
the notion that information, including traceability, is valuable to consumers and 
other members of the marketing chain, they also indicate that many consumers 
express a willingness to pay for this additional information. The uniqueness of the 
problem addressed in this paper is that we examine consumer attitudes about 
traceability immediately preceding and immediately following a major food safety 
event (the American BSE case in December 2003). The data also help address a 
major policy question about whether or not American consumers are willing to pay 
                                                           
6 Other methods of communications could include advertising, point of sale materials, etc. R. Ward, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
© 2005 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved.  96
for implementing an animal traceability system. Although traceability is a 
fundamental component of any livestock system attempting to deal with BSE, it is 
costly to implement (USAIP (2004); Sparks (2002); and Buhr (2002)). Consequently, 
measuring consumer attitudes about traceability can gauge political support for 
these systems and how costs for implementing the systems might be shared by the 
public and private sectors.  
 
Methods and Data 
 
We focus specifically on US consumers and examine whether consumer WTA non-
traceable beef, either imported from Canada or produced domestically, changed 
following the US BSE case. This approach was selected assuming that traceability 
will eventually be the imposed baseline standard in both the US and Canada and 
that WTA would measure what consumers would need to be paid to go back to the 




Auction experiments were employed to measure US participants’ WTA for non-
traceable US beef and traceable and non-traceable Canadian beef. Auction 
experiments have been used to elicit WTP and WTA food product characteristics 
when publicly available data were not available or were prohibitively costly to 
gather (e.g., Huffman et al. (2003a) and (2003b); Dickinson and Bailey (2003) and 
(2002); Shogren, List, and Hayes (2000); Shogren et al. (1994a) and (1994b)). 
 
We follow basically the same design proposed by Shogren et al. (1994a) and used by 
Dickinson and Bailey (2002) and (2003). However, rather than eliciting bids from 
participants to “upgrade” a sandwich from a baseline to a different sandwich with 
enhanced characteristics, we provided participants with a baseline traceable US 
beef sandwich and then elicited their WTA an alternative sandwich that was non-
traceable and/or consisted of imported Canadian beef. This WTA represents the 
discount in price necessary to entice the participant to accept what they perceive to 
be an inferior product compared to the baseline. 
 
Subjects were recruited from four different demographic groups at Utah State 
University in Logan, Utah. These cohorts included faculty members, students, 
professional employees (non-faculty employees in professional positions such as 
accounting, human resource management, etc.), and classified employees 
(groundskeepers, food service workers, staff assistants, etc.). Subjects were 
recruited by announcements in class (students) and by email and announcement 
flyers that were distributed around campus. Four different experiments were held 
(one each for each cohort) with approximately 13-14 participants in each 
experiment. Experiments were conducted with individuals of similar socioeconomic 
characteristics (cohorts) in each individual experiment to lower the potential R. Ward, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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influence of socioeconomic status barriers within the group and to isolate the 
potential influence of socioeconomic characteristics on bidding behavior (Dickinson 
and Bailey (2002)). 
 
The first set of four experiments was held during the first week of December 2003 
(pre-BSE) . A second set of four experiments was held during the last week of 
January 2004 (post-BSE) . The pre-BSE experiments were originally conducted to 
determine if certifying traceability in Canadian beef would make it more acceptable 
to American participants after the Canadian BSE case in May 2003. The US BSE 
case was announced on December 23, 2003, almost immediately after the first set of 
experiments had been conducted. Obviously, the December 23rd announcement 
changed the market landscape for beef in the US. This was the motivation for 
conducting the post-BSE experiments in January 2004. As a result, quite by 
accident, a data set was developed that measured US participants’ WTA almost 
immediately prior to the American BSE case and almost immediately thereafter.  
 
The steps followed in both the pre- and post-BSE sets of experiment were the 
following: 
 
Step 1: Subjects in the experiment were seated and told a lunch sitting in front of 
them, consisting of the baseline US traceable beef sandwich, chips, dessert, and 
drink was “free.” The participants were also given $15 in cash at the beginning of 
the one-hour experiment.  
 
Step 2: Subjects were assigned an identification number to ensure anonymity of the 
data they provided. Participants were informed verbally and also provided with 
written instructions7 that indicated they would be allowed to bid for what they 
would require to be paid to “switch” their baseline sandwich for each of four 
alternative sandwiches. Subjects were told that for the baseline sandwich “certified 
information is available that the beef in this sandwich can be traced back to the 
farm in the US where it originated and this beef has been inspected.” The subjects 
were given the following information about the alternative sandwiches in the 
experiment: Sandwich 1 – certified information is available that the beef in this 
sandwich can be traced back to the farm where it originated. The beef in the 
sandwich has also been inspected and imported from Canada; Sandwich 2 – 
certified information is available that the beef in this sandwich has been inspected 
and that it was imported from Canada; Sandwich 3 – certified information is 
available that the beef in this sandwich has been inspected and that it originated in 
the USA; and Sandwich 4 – certified information is available that this sandwich has 
been inspected. 
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Step 3: Participants were informed that they would be allowed to place anonymous 
bids for what they would need to be paid to give up their baseline sandwich for each 
of the four alternative sandwiches. To ensure that bids would be placed based only 
on the information provided, the sandwiches were constructed so that the baseline 
and the four alternatives looked virtually identical and subjects were not allowed to 
eat until after the auction. There is some discussion in the literature about whether 
nth-price auctions or 2nd-price (Vickery) auctions elicit more accurate results about 
consumer demand (Shogren et al. (2001)). Parkhurst, Shogren, and Dickinson 
(2004) indicate that the average bids using either procedure should be the same and 
a Vickery (2nd-price) auction is used in our experiments.8 
 
Step 4: After all questions had been answered, a trial auction using a baseline 
candy bar and asking participants to provide anonymous bids regarding the 
appropriate discount or, conversely, what they would need to be paid (WTA), i.e., 
the bribe required, to accept a different candy bar. The trial was designed to give 
participants experience regarding how the actual auctions would operate. There 
were two rounds of bidding for two candy bars. After both trials’ rounds were 
finished, random numbers were drawn to select the “binding” round and “binding” 
candy bar. Money and the candy were then exchanged for the binding candy bar.  
 
After answering additional questions following the trial auction, written bids were 
taken from each participant for Sandwich 1, then Sandwich 2, then Sandwich 3, 
and finally Sandwich 4. Six total rounds were completed in order for the bid 
amounts to stabilize (e.g., Hayes et al (1995); Shogren et al. (2001); Dickinson and 
Bailey (2002) and (2003)). The potential “winner” in any given round for any given 
sandwich was the person with the lowest bid. However, the potential payoff to the 
winner was the 2nd lowest bid (Vickery auction style). The “winning” bid for each 
sandwich (2nd lowest bid) was announced at the end of each round to provide 
participants with “market” information. Each participant’s bid was recorded by an 
assistant at the end of each round so that data on every bid placed by each 
participant was preserved. 
 
Step 5: Following the completion of all six rounds, a round was selected at random 
as the binding round and a sandwich was selected at random as the binding 
sandwich. This made the participant’s every bid in every round a potentially 
binding bid. Participants were fully aware before the auction rounds commenced 
                                                           
8 The theoretical reference indicating a 2
nd-price auction is demand revealing is found in Vickery (1961). However, 
there remains discussion about which pricing method in experimental auctions is "best". There are probably other 
demand-revealing mechanisms as well, and the 2
nd-price auction is simply one of them. Parkhurst, Shogren, 
Dickinson (2004) found that there was some under or over bidding in the 2
nd-price auctions (under bidding if you 
negatively valued the good, overbidding if you positively valued the good). Parkhurst, Shogren and Dickinson(2004) 
indicated that random n
th-price auction did not have this bias, but the variance in bids in n
th-price was twice as high 
as in 2
nd-price auctions. Consequently, there is no conclusive evidence that one is better than the other at this point. 
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that this would be done. The person “winning” the randomly selected alternative 
sandwich in the binding round was paid the winning amount and the binding 
alternative sandwich was switched with the winner’s baseline sandwich. 
 
Step 6: Participants were asked to complete a survey9 eliciting not only 
socioeconomic information (age, gender education, income, etc.) about themselves 
and their family, but also other information that might influence bids. For example, 
participants were asked how many servings of beef they consumed each week, the 
percentage of meals consumed at home, and whether or not a family member had 
become sufficiently ill from a of a food-borne illness to require hospitalization.  
 
Comparisons of Pre- and Post-BSE Participants 
 
Table 1 presents the set of variables together with their descriptive statistics that 
was developed from the auctions and the survey responses used in the analysis. 
Participants in both the pre- and post-BSE experimental auctions were also asked a 
battery of questions to determine their knowledge of specific characteristics relating 
to the Canadian BSE case in May 2003 (e.g., province where BSE was found, 
number of infected animals found, when BSE was found, etc.) and were also asked 
about their general knowledge of BSE as a disease (e.g., how humans contract the 
disease, how BSE is diagnosed, etc.). A variable, BSECAN, was constructed as the 
percentage of correct answers the participant gave about the Canadian BSE crisis. 
Another variable, BSEKNOW, was constructed as the percentage of correct answers 
about BSE (Table 1).  
 
Although individual participants in the pre- and post-BSE sets of experiments were 
not identical, the same socioeconomic categories (faculty, students, professional 
employees, and classified employees) were used. Table 2 presents comparisons of 
the socioeconomic characteristics for the pre- and post-BSE groups. Table 2 reveals 
that only a few statistically significant differences existed between the pre- and 
post-BSE participants. These differences were that post-BSE participants were less 
likely to be married (MARRIED), less likely to do their household’s grocery 
shopping (SHOP), were less motivated by food safety concerns when purchasing 
meat (FSIMP), and knew more about the Canadian BSE case than did pre-BSE 
participants (BSECAN) (Table 2). 
 
Whether animal identification in the US should be a voluntary or mandatory 
program has been a matter of discussion for some time but has become an especially 
important issue since December 23rd. We asked participants in the post-BSE 
auctions to indicate whether they believed animal identification in the US should be 
voluntary or mandatory. Most participants (69%) believe animal identification 
should be a mandatory program. Those believing animal identification should be  
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Table 1: Variable Names and Descriptions.  
Variable Description  Mean  Std.Dev.
AVGBID  Average of bid for all six rounds for all sandwiches  2.479  8.236 
FEMALE  Female =1, 0 otherwise  49.6%  50.1% 
AGE  Age of subject in years  35.319 11.593 
MARRIED  Married =1, 0 otherwise  72.3%  44.8% 
CHILDREN  Presence of children in household under 18 =1, 0 otherwise  43.4%  49.6% 
SERVINGS  Number of times beef products are eaten each week.   3.058   1.810 
SHOP  Primary grocery shopper in household = 1, 0 otherwise  62.2%  48.6% 
ATHOME  Over 50% of meals prepared at home =1, 0 otherwise  92.0%  27.1% 
ILLNESS  In past five years someone in household or immediate family 
suffered from a food borne illness = 1, 0 otherwise 
33.0% 47.1% 
PRIMP  Ranked price as first or second (out of 6) most important 
determinant of meat purchases = 1, 0 otherwise 
50.5% 50.1% 
FSIMP  Ranked "safety of meat" as first or second (out of 6) most 
important determinant of meat purchases = 1, 0 otherwise 
45.0% 49.8% 
TRUSTUS  On a 5 point scale with 5 being "very good assurance" and 1 
indicating "no assurance", rated "USDA inspection" as a 4 or 
above =1, 0 otherwise 
82.1% 38.3% 
TRUSTCAN  On a 5 point scale with 5 being "very good assurance" and 1 
indicating "no assurance", rated "Imported from Canada" as a 4 
or above =1, 0 otherwise 
20.5% 40.4% 
SOMECOL  Less than a bachelors degree has been achieved =1, 0 otherwise  33.6%  47.3% 
COLLEGE  Bachelors degree is the highest level of education achieved =1, 0 
otherwise 
31.9% 46.6% 
POSTGRAD  Graduate degree is the highest level of education achieved =1, 0 
otherwise 
34.5% 47.6% 
LOWINC  Household income is < $30,000 =1, 0 otherwise  40.2%  49.1% 
MIDINC  Household income is $30,000 - $59,999 =1, 0 otherwise  33.0%  47.1% 
HIGHINC  Household income is $60,000+ =1, 0 otherwise  26.8%  44.3% 
BSECAN  Score on a test about knowledge of BSE incidence(s) in U.S. and 
Canada (note: for experiments before outbreak in U.S. questions 
dealt with the Canadian incidence.) 
43.5% 27.0% 
BSEKNOW  Score on test about scientific knowledge of BSE  55.6%  27.2% 
Sandwich 1 
(S1) 
Certified information is available that the beef in this sandwich 
can be traced back to the farm where is originated and has been 
inspected and imported from Canada=1, 0 otherwise 
     
Sandwich 2 
(S2) 
Certified information is available that the beef in this sandwich 
has been inspected and imported from Canada=1, 0 otherwise 
     
Sandwich 3 
(S3) 
Certified information is available that the beef in this sandwich 
has been inspected and that it originated in the U.S.=1, 0 
otherwise 
     
Sandwich 4 
(S4) 
Certified information is available that the beef in this sandwich 
has been inspected =1, 0 otherwise 
     
ANIMID  Animal ID system should be mandatory =1, voluntary =0 (note: 
only asked for groups after BSE in U.S.) 
69.1% 46.3% 
BEFORE  Subject from experiment before BSE outbreak in U.S.=1, 0 
otherwise 
51.3% 50.0% R. Ward, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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Table 2: Overall Means for Variables Included in the Study Together with Tests for 
Significant Differences (10% Level of Significance) Between Pre- and Post-BSE 
Experimental Groups and Between Participants in Favor of a Voluntary or 
Mandatory Animal ID System in the US.  
Variable Mean  Change after BSE in 
U.S. a 
Mean for Mandatory vs. 
voluntary b 
FEMALE  49.6%   n/c c n/c 
AGE  35.32  n/c n/c 
MARRIED  72.3%  - n/c 
CHILDREN   0.43  n/c n/c 
SERVINGS (No.)  3.06  n/c n/c 
SHOP  62.2%  - n/c 
ATHOME  92.0%  n/c n/c 
ILLNESS  33.0%  n/c n/c 
PRIMP  50.5%  n/c n/c 
FSIMP  45.0%  - n/c 
TRUSTUS  82.1%  n/c n/c 
TRUSTCAN  20.5%  n/c - 
SOMECOL  33.6%  n/c n/c 
COLLEGE  31.9%  n/c n/c 
POSTGRAD  34.5%  n/c n/c 
LOWINC  40.2%  n/c n/c 
MIDINC  33.0%  n/c n/c 
HIGHINC  26.8%  n/c n/c 
BSECAN  43.5%  + + 
BSEKNOW  55.6%  n/c + 
a + (-) indicates significant increase (decrease) in means for subjects after the BSE incidence in the 
U.S. 
b + (-) indicates significant higher (lower) means for subjects favoring mandatory animal ID systems. 
It should be noted that only subjects after the BSE incidence in the U.S. were asked this question. 
c n/c indicates no significant change in means of two groups. 
 
 
mandatory in the US were statistically less certain about the quality of imported 
Canadian beef (TRUSTCAN) and knew more about the Canadian BSE case 
(BSECAN) and BSE in general (BSE) than did those desiring a voluntary program 




Regression analysis was used to determine the participant characteristics, (age, 
gender, income, education, knowledge about BSE, past illness, etc.) that affected 
average WTA. Two models were formulated. The first includes a dummy variable R. Ward, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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BEFORE which will measure the average change, with all variables considered 
contemporaneously, in the bribe needed to switch sandwiches before the BSE 
incidence versus after. The second model instead of using one dummy variable for a 
before and after effect, includes slope dummies as a change in structure after the 







where variable names and descriptions are given in Table 1. The subscript “i” 
indicates the ith sandwich type (i=1, 2, 3, 4) and the subscript “j” is for the jth 
participant (j= 1, 2, 3, . . .,113). 
 
Many of the variables in equation (1) are binary. The base regression was for WTA 
Sandwich 4 (S4), the non-traceable beef of unknown origin, by participants with only 
a high school education or less (HIGH SCHOOL) and in the lowest income category 
(LOWINC). The parameter estimate on BEFORE ( 20 α ) is a key variable because it 
is a test for whether or not average WTA alternative sandwiches changed after the 
US BSE case in December 2003. A significant negative value for BEFORE’s 
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equation 2 a positive value for any δ  (or ϕ) would indicate that the participants 
with that characteristic before the BSE incident in December 2003 would require a 




Table 3 reports the average bids for WTA alternative sandwiches and an initial 
statistical analysis for differences in average WTA between pre- and post-BSE 
auctions. The results presented in Table 3 indicate that WTA (S1, S2, S3, and S4) is 
non-zero in all cases. This suggests that, on the average, a non-zero amount would 
need to be paid to participants to entice them to substitute their baseline sandwich 
for one of the alternative sandwiches. Average WTA was higher for S1, S2, and S3 in 
the post-BSE auctions than in the pre-BSE auctions. However, a comparison of pre- 
and post-BSE coefficients of variation (F statistic in Table 3) that variability in 
WTA increased for S1, S2, and S3 in the post-BSE than in the pre-BSE experiments. 
This provides evidence for increased uncertainty regarding the value of 
certifications for traceability and country of origin after the US BSE incident. This 
may help to explain why average bids to accept S4 declined as did the variability of 
bids for S4 in the post-BSE auctions compared to the pre-BSE auctions. It is 
probable that participants in the post-BSE experiments were simply less certain as 
a group about the value of different certifications after December 23rd than they 
were before December 23rd.  
 
WTA for S3, the sandwich providing US country-of-origin certification but not 
traceability, was barely statistically different than zero at the 10% level in the post-
BSE experiments.10 A comparison of the pre- and post-BSE mean WTA for the 
alternative sandwiches reveals that, statistically speaking, WTA increased in the 
post-BSE auctions only for S1 (Pre S1 – Post S1 in Table 3), the traceable Canadian 
beef sandwich. This indicates that subjects in the post-BSE auctions needed a 
larger bribe than subjects in the pre-BSE auctions to switch their baseline sandwich 
for S1. At the time the post-BSE auctions were held, a public announcement had 
been made reporting that the BSE cow in the state of Washington was of Canadian 
origin. The results suggest that for the participants in these auctions the US BSE 
case likely hurt the reputation of Canadian beef more than it did US beef. This is 
based on that fact that, as a group, post-BSE participants needed larger bribes to 
accept Canadian beef, even if it was traceable, than did pre-BSE participants. 
 
Table 4 reports the parameter estimates for Models 1 and 2. The results for model 1 
are random-effects model of average WTA amounts required to entice participants 
to accept a non-baseline sandwich. Results for Model 2 reported in Table 4 are a  
                                                           
10 A WTA equaling zero would indicate that subjects would not need to be bribed to switch their baseline sandwich 
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Table 3: WTA Average Bids and Statistical Comparisons for Pre- and Post-BSE 
Auctions. 
Variable(s)      Mean   Standard    F Comparing  t-statistic 
         Error      Variances  for   
         P r e -   A n d   P o s t -  
           BSE Auctions 
 
Combined Experiments: 
S1     $1.48     0.258     5.743*** 
S2      $3.07     1.023        3.000*** 
S3     $1.86     0.795        2.349** 




S1     $1.12     0.250        4.503*** 
S2     $1.89     0.525        3.611*** 
S3     $1.12     0.378        2.970*** 




S1     $1.86     0.457        4.064*** 
S2     $4.30     2.024        2.126** 
S3     $2.65     1.586        1.673* 
S4     $3.06     0.579        5.284*** 
N=55 
 
Comparisons Pre- and Post-BSE :       
Pre S1 – Post S1    -$0.73    0.513    3.175***  -1.426*a 
Pre S2 – Post S2   -$2.40     2.043   14.114***  -1.179 
Pre S3 – Post S3   -$1.54     1.591   16.913***  -0.966 
Pre S3 – Post S4     $0.86     1.614     6.820***b   0.536 
 
*** Denotes statistically different than zero at the 1% level. 
** Denotes statistically different than zero at the 5% level. 
* Denotes statistically different than zero at the 1% level. 
a One-tailed t-test of significance (see Kmenta, p. 145 (1986)). 
b The variance in the pre-BSE auctions for S4 was more than the variance for S4 in the post-BSE 
auctions. The convention for calculating the F statistic places the largest variance as the 
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Table 4: Estimation Results (Dependent Variable = Subject’s Average Subject Bid 
Over Six Auction Rounds).  
  
Random Effects Model  
Without slope dummies 
Fixed Effects Model 
With Slope dummies 
Variable Coefficient  a 
Standard 
Error  Coefficient a 
Standard 
Error 
Lagrange multiplier test  27.62  ***    13.02 ***   
Hausman test  31.95          
R2 .152      .514    
Number of observations  416     416    
            
Constant  7.230 **  3.356       
FEMALE  -0.165     1.229  8.495    6.881 
AGE  -0.142 ***  0.052  -0.263    0.207 
MARRIED  -0.773     1.455  6.111    3.975 
CHILDREN  0.456     1.168  1.662    3.242 
SHOP  -2.973 **  1.206  -9.304    7.887 
ATHOME  2.954 *** 1.098  3.059    3.793 
ILLNESS  3.230 *** 1.045  6.349  *  3.786 
PRIMP  1.402     1.186  -1.083    4.029 
FSIMP  1.886     1.324  10.299    6.425 
SERVINGS  0.152     0.268  -3.963  ***  0.910 
TRUSTUS  -3.193 **  1.290  2.077    5.512 
TRUSTCAN  1.214     1.335  7.917  ** 3.993 
Education b            
SOMECOL  -0.334     1.258  0.332    3.565 
COLLEGE  -0.278     1.507  0.491    5.349 
POSTGRAD  0.252     2.623  13.072    16.217 
Income c            
MIDINC  4.819 *** 1.275  1.273    4.604 
HIGHINC  2.610     1.776  3.254    5.621 
BSE Knowledge            
BSECAN  -4.242 **  2.140  15.534    10.177 
BSEKNOW  3.634 **  1.845  -3.668    7.802 
Meat Characteristics d            
Sandwich 1  -2.139 **  1.014  -1.256    1.387 
Sandwich 2  -0.433     1.014  1.459    1.387 
Sandwich 3  -1.641   e  1.014 -0.190    1.387 
BEFORE  -0.139     1.031       
Slope changes in variables before          
FEMALEB       -2.169    16.279 
AGEB       0.078    0.185 
MARRIEDB       -0.409    7.314 
CHILDRENB       -7.558    5.841 
SHOPB       4.346    13.791 
ATHOMEB       0.651    8.169 
ILLNESSB       -2.203    7.116 
PRIMPB       2.230    7.255 
FSIMPB       -12.468  **  5.844 
SERVINGSB       7.415  ***  2.194 R. Ward, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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TRUSTUSB       -5.367    6.559 
TRUSTCANB       -12.130    8.653 
SOMECOLB       -7.789    7.725 
COLLEGEB       6.549    8.106 
POSTGRADB       -8.392    18.324 
MIDINCB       2.536    8.353 
HIGHINCB       -6.641    9.712 
BSECANB       7.696    14.866 
BSEKNOWB       -34.765    25.454 
Sandwich 1B       -1.670    1.906 
Sandwich 2B       -3.578  *  1.906 
Sandwich 3B           -2.742     1.906 
a ***=.01 significance, **=.05 significance and *=.10 significance. 
b Base is high school highest education degree. 
c Base is low income (household income < $30,000).  




fixed effects model. The random effects model for equation 1 follows Dickinson and 
Bailey (2002) and (2003) and was selected after the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) and 
Hausman tests revealed that to be the appropriate estimation procedure (Table 4) 
(Greene (2003)). For Model 2, the variance-covariance matrix could not be inverted 
so the Hausman test could not be used. The regression analysis was necessary to 
account for socioeconomic and other participant characteristics that might affect 
participants’ WTA the alternative sandwiches. 
 
Because this is a WTA model, the interpretation of a positive (negative) coefficient 
is that presence of that characteristic increases (decreases) the bribe that would 
need to be paid to the subject for them to accept one of the alternative sandwiches 
as a substitute for the baseline sandwich. Again, the baseline sandwich contains 
traceable, US beef.  
 
The results in Table 4 indicate that there is no firm statistical evidence to indicate 
that, on the average, WTA alternative sandwiches changed after the US BSE case 
(insignificant parameter estimate on BEFORE ( 20 α )). However, the relatively large 
standard error, compared to the magnitude of the parameter estimate for BEFORE, 
implies a fair amount of variation in average WTA bids between pre- and post-BSE 
participants (see Table 3) and supports the notion that uncertainty about WTA 
generally increased after December 23rd.  
 
This can be seen in the results of Model 2 where participants concerned about food 
safety required smaller bribes for switching their sandwich before the December 
2003 incident of BSE. This was also true for the bribe needed to purchase the 
Canadian sandwich which was not traceable. This indicates that consumers may 
have viewed the December 2003 BSE incident as a Canadian problem. Model 2 also R. Ward, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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shows that as servings increased the average bribe needed was larger before the 
outbreak than it was after the outbreak. 
 
The results reported in Table 4 also indicate that both traceability and country-of-
origin information (S1) (even if the meat is imported) or knowing the beef was 
produced domestically (S3) were more acceptable to participants than simply 
knowing the meat was inspected ( S4). These results confirm both Loureiro and 
Umberger’s findings (2003) that country-of-origin information is valuable to US 
consumers and Dickinson and Bailey’s ((2002) and (2003)) findings that traceability 
is a valuable market characteristic. This implies that even though the overall 
reputation of Canadian beef has been damaged among our participants since the US 
BSE case (Table 3), traceability makes Canadian beef more acceptable than if it is 
non-traceable. This is based on a Wald test of the restriction that the parameter 
estimates for S1 and S2 being equal ( 2 1 β β = ) which revealed that 2 1 β β < .11 
 
Socioeconomic and other participant characteristic played a role in their WTA 
alternative sandwiches. Participants eating most of their meals at home (ATHOME) 
required more money to give up their baseline sandwich than did participants 
eating most of their meals away from home, on the average. While person who are 
the primary shoppers in their household (SHOP) required a smaller bribe, on the 
average, to give up their baseline sandwich than participants who were not the 
primary shoppers in their households. This might suggest that persons eating away 
from home expect vendors to provide implicit assurances while those eating mostly 
at home and who make most of the shopping choices for their household have a 
greater sense of control when choosing desired assurances. Participants who had 
experienced a serious food-borne illness in their family (ILLNESS) also required 
higher bribes, on the average, to give up their baseline sandwich than participants 
not having this characteristic.  
 
Participants with high degrees of trust in the US government inspections 
(TRUSTGOV) were more likely to substitute their baseline sandwich freely among 
the alternative sandwiches than were participants with less trust of US government 
inspection. This suggests that certifications beyond simple government inspection 
(i.e., traceability and country of origin) are simply not as important to this group as 
they were to people with less trust in the US government.  
 
Similarly, the older the participant (AGE) the more willing he/she was to substitute 
the baseline sandwich for one of the alternative sandwiches. This suggests that 
traceability and country-or-origin certifications were more important to younger 
participants than they were to older participants. 
 
                                                           
11 
2
1 χ = 2.81 which indicates different values for the parameters at the 10% confidence level. R. Ward, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
© 2005 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved.  108
A participant’s education level was not found to significantly affect their WTA 
alternative baseline sandwiches. However, participants with annual household 
incomes above $30,000 needed to be paid more, on the average, than participants 
from low income households indicating that income is a significant determinant of 
the demand for traceability (see MIDINC in Table 4). 
 
Knowledge of the Canadian BSE case (BSECAN) significantly reduced WTA. This 
suggests that educating US consumers about the Canadian BSE event may increase 
their willingness to accept (purchase) Canadian beef since those functioning on 
rumor rather than facts have poorer perceptions of Canadian beef than do those 
with a knowledge of the Canadian BSE case. However, knowledge about BSE in 
general (BSEKNOW) required bigger bribes for subjects to give up their baseline 
sandwich. This suggests that persons with above average knowledge about scientific 
matters concerning BSE valued traceability and country of origin information more 
than participants with less knowledge about BSE. This implies that educating 
people about BSE from a scientific perspective will likely result in more support for 
traceability and country of origin programs.  
 
Mandatory Animal Identification Program 
 
A logistical regression was used to determine if any of the socioeconomic and other 
characteristics indicated in equation (1) affected whether or not participants in the 
post-BSE auctions supported voluntary or mandatory animal ID programs in the 
US (Table 5).  
 
A somewhat surprising result gathered from the logit analysis was that participants 
having knowledge of the Canadian BSE incident and scientific knowledge about 
BSE (BSECAN and BSE, respectively) were also less likely to support mandatory 
animal ID than participants without these characteristics. Persons who are 
knowledgeable about BSE realize that an animal ID system will not prevent the 
disease. However, they should also know that an animal ID system will be a 
significant aid in tracing a problem should one occur. Unfortunately, the 
questionnaire did not ask participants directly about how an animal ID system 
could be useful following a BSE episode. Consequently, the level of understanding 
regarding the necessity of an animal ID to track problems is unknown. This could 
be contributing to this result and would indicate that while a person may have 
knowledge about BSE, many of them still do not understand why an animal 
tracking system would be needed following the discovery of a BSE case(s) or they 
may be opposed to a mandatory program for some reason. 
 
TRUSTCAN increased the probability of a participant favoring mandatory ID. This 
is not surprising because the Canadian animal ID system is mandatory and if a 
participant trusted the Canadian system, they would likely favor a similar system 
being implemented in the US.  R. Ward, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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Table 5: Marginal Effects for Binomial Logit Model Predicting Whether or Not the 
Participant Supports Mandatory Animal Identification in the United States.  
Variable 
Coefficient for 
Marginal effect a  Standard error 
Correct predictions for 0  11/17   
Correct predictions for 1  27/32   
Number of observations  49   
    
Constant  1.615*** 0.515 
FEMALE  -0.093 0.206 
AGE  -0.009 0.009 
MARRIED  -0.250 0.206 
CHILDREN  -0.103 0.184 
SHOP  0.050 0.192 
ATHOME  -0.221 0.165 
ILLNESS  -0.102 0.185 
PRIMP  -0.306 0.204 
FSIMP  -0.152 0.212 
SERVINGS  -0.018 0.043 
TRUSTUS  -0.097 0.229 
TRUSTCAN  0.569** 0.247 
Education b    
SOMECOL  0.242 0.194 
COLLEGE  0.090 0.218 
Income c    
MIDHGINC  0.242 0.202 
BSE Knowledge    
BSECAN  -0.614* 0.357 
BSEKNOW  -0.620* 0.329 
a ***=.01 significance, **=.05 significance and *=.10 significance. 
b Base is high school highest education degree. POSTGRAD was not included in the regression 
because of colinearity problems. 
c Base is low income (household income < $30,000). Because of difficulties in inverting the variance-
covariance matrix for the Hausman test, MIDINC and HIGHINC were combined so that the 
MIDINC is measuring the effect of all incomes above $30,000. 
 
 
The results indicate that support for mandatory ID among the participants is 
widespread (69% of participants) and is based, at least to some degree, on their 
trust in the Canadian government and knowledge of BSE and BSE incidents. Given 
that average WTA is non-zero, the results provide some evidence for a large number 
of US consumers being willing to support the implementation of a mandatory R. Ward, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 2, 2005 
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animal ID program with tax dollars. Of course, these results should be confirmed 




A series of experimental auctions were conducted immediately preceding and 
following the announcement on December 23, 2003 that a cow in the state of 
Washington had been diagnosed with BSE. The data set offers some unique insights 
into the effects of BSE on beef demand in the US because it provides a snapshot of 
demand for a set of American consumers on both sides of a major food safety event. 
 
The results indicate that information about traceability and country of origin is  
valuable to consumers. They also suggest that greater uncertainty about 
certifications and assurances for beef existed among the participants after 
December 23rd than before December 23rd. While this is not surprising, it indicates 
that US consumers, while not necessarily changing beef buying habits, were subject 
to some “shock” to their overall perceptions about beef and certifications and 
assurances about beef. 
 
Perhaps one of the most important findings was that participants’ demand for 
Canadian beef was more adversely affected by the US BSE crisis than was the 
demand for US beef. This implies that US consumers have placed at least some of 
the “blame” for the US BSE incident on Canada because the subject animal was 
born there. 
 
The results suggest that a large percentage of US consumers would support a 
mandatory animal ID system in the US and would be willing to pay something for 
it. Additional work is needed to confirm these results. However, they confirm that 
the US BSE case caused some important changes in American consumer attitudes. 
Consequently, the US beef industry should not assume that no noticeable change in 
US consumer attitudes about beef occurred after December 23, 2003. Consumers 
are more uncertain about beef products than they were prior to December 23rd. 
Additional BSE cases could exacerbate this uncertainty. The movement toward 
animal ID systems appears to be a good strategic move by the US beef industry and 
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